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Non-Technical Summary
Analysing banking supervision in a principal-agent framework helps to explain the
existence of regulatory failure (Kane, 1989a). This paper discusses the incentive
conflicts that arise in banking supervision in the EU in a principal-agent framework,
where the regulator is the agent and the taxpayers is the principal.
The interests of the regulator (agent) deviate from those of the principal, the
taxpayers, or in general the society. The reason for that is that the regulatory agent in
addition to maintaining financial stability (the ultimate objective of the principal)
may pursue private interests. Incomplete information, insufficient accountability of
the regulatory agent and lack of enforceability of compliance result in an incentive
problem. In the European context this incentive problem comprises two dimensions:
The vertical dimension refers to the “traditional” principal-agent relationship in a
national context. The horizontal dimension results from the fact that there exists EU-
wide systemic risk potential. Thus, regulatory forbearance in the European context
includes also disregarding of cross-border externalities, insufficient monitoring of
foreign branches, and lack with regard to the exchange of information with other
supervisors.
Since the first best solution, i.e. a contract between the regulator and the society that
fully aligns incentives, is not achievable other solutions are needed. In this paper we
stress the importance of improving accountability of the supervisory agent through
market discipline based on enhanced disclosure of both the supervisory authority
and the regulated banking industry. With respect to the supervisory authority,
enhanced disclosure could comprise publication of reports on supervisory actions
taken and their general results. Such reports should be published after some delay
since any announcement of actions on specific occasions could impair confidence in
the “target institution”. In addition, publication of cost-benefit-analyses of regulatory
actions (as already done by the FSA in the UK) may contribute to improving
regulators’ compliance culture by offering a objective way to discuss regulation.
Improving disclosure of information by the banking industry seems to be particular
of importance with respect to risk taking strategies, risk exposures and risk
management tools. Strengthening the disciplinary role of the market would alleviate
the incentive problem in two ways: Directly, since regulatory agents would be keen
to improve their regulatory performance in order to avoid the need for unwelcome
disclosure. And indirectly, since market discipline with respect to the banking
institutions strengthens the overall supervisory system by improving bank managers’
incentives for prudent risk-taking, thereby, reducing the opportunities for regulatory
forbearance.
In addition, an international monitoring agency for regulators, by providing gradings
and the reasoning behind them, may help to identify suboptimal supervisory
performance, thereby, improving accountability of regulators.
However, accomplishing accountability in practice remains a difficult task and
improved market discipline can only complement a proper design of supervisory
arrangements. Therefore, a reform of the current European supervisory framework is
needed. A single European supervisory authority would solve the horizontal
dimension of the incentive problem by internalising cross-border externalities in
supervision. However, due to political constraints an improvement of the current
system of co-operation and co-ordination of national regulators may be more
advisable. In this context, the establishment of explicit arrangements and
mechanisms of punishment to ensure compliance are crucial.
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41 Introduction
It is a well-known fact in banking regulation that incomplete information and
agency problems result in undesirable incentives and, thus, in inefficient
outcomes. Principal-agent relationships are well-cited and have been extensively
analysed between the bank regulator and the financial institution. So far less
acknowledged in the literature is the relationship between the taxpayers as the
principal and the banking supervisor as the agent. Against the background of the
current European situation analysing this relationship is, however, particularly
important.
In Europe the degree of integration of the market for banking and financial
services has increased significantly (e.g., Enria and Vesala, 2003). This
development may have increased interdependencies among financial institutions
of different countries which in turn may have led to a rise in the potential of
cross-border contagion, i.e. systemic risk at the European level. Indeed there is
some evidence that the EU-wide systemic risk potential has increased (Schüler,
2003a, Schröder and Schüler, 2003). Thus, it is likely that a bank failure in one
country will have adverse effects on the banking sectors in other European
countries.
Despite these potential cross-border externalities banking supervision in the
European Union (EU) is organised at a national level (Vives, 2001, Lannoo,
2002, Enria and Vesala, 2003). The ‘home country’ has full responsibility for
prudential supervision of individual financial institutions. Also monitoring and
safeguarding the stability of the financial system remains a national task. The
Eurosystem has no direct responsibility, but merely the task of contributing to
the national policies relating to prudential supervision and financial stability. 1
Consequently, it is the sole responsibility of the ‘host country’ to deal with the
stability of its financial system and problems resulting from bank failure or
distress.
This home country control principle may pose severe incentive problems
(Mayes and Vesala, 2000). On the side of the host supervisors incentives to
monitor foreign institutions and deliver input to the supervisory process may be
limited since they are not ultimately responsible for supervising these
institutions, although these institutions may pose a severe threat to the host
financial system in the case of a failure. On the home supervisors’ side,
incentives to adequately monitor a foreign branch may be blunted if the bank is
                                       
1 Article 105(5) of the Treaty states that the Eurosystem is to “contribute to the smooth
conduct of policies pursued by competent authorities relating to the prudential supervision
of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system”.
5relatively small from the home country perspective. In this case a failure would
not cause serious problems for the parent company and, hence, not for the home
financial market. However, significance of this branch in a small host country
may be large, thus, posing a systemic threat to that country’s financial market in
the case of distress.
In general the discrepancy between EU-wide systemic risk and national
supervision may cause the problem that national supervisors disregard cross-
border externalities resulting from integrated European banking markets.
Consequently, national supervisors may fulfil a suboptimal supervisory policy.
This distortion of outcome constitutes a conflict between the interests of voters-
taxpayers as principals and the narrower interests of the officials that the
political system appoints to serve as their agents, i.e. the supervisors. This
conflict of incentives results from the fact that voters and taxpayers have
incomplete information about the actions of their national supervisors.
Moreover, due to private interests the agent doesn’t act in a welfare-maximising
way.
The described current European situation, i.e. the existence of cross-border
externalities, adds a new dimension to the principal-agent problem between the
voters-taxpayers and the supervisor. This situation has raised several questions,
including the following:
§ What is the effect of an increasing EU-wide systemic risk potential on the
supervisory effort if there exists only a contract between the principal and the
agent at the national level?
§ What is the effect of the Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) and other
forms of co-operation at the European level on the implicit contracts between
the principals and the agents?
§ What would be the optimal contract to achieve the efficient level of
supervisory effort?
§ What would be the effect of a centralisation of the contract relationship, i.e. if
there would be a centralised EU supervisor having multiple principals?
The aim of this paper is to discuss the incentive conflicts that arise in the
European context in a principal-agent framework and – based on this analysis –
draw conclusions on how to best align incentives. We argue that strengthening
market discipline based on improved disclosure of both supervisory authorities
and regulated banking institutions may help to improve accountability of the
supervisory agent and, thus, help to alleviate the incentive problem. However,
improved market discipline can only complement a proper design of supervisory
6arrangements. Therefore, a reform of the current European supervisory
framework is called for. A single European supervisory authority would solve
parts of the incentive problem by internalising cross-border externalities in
supervision. However, due to political constraints an improvement of the current
system of co-operation and co-ordination of national regulators may be more
realistic.
The paper is organised as follows. The next section discusses the related
literature. Section 3 describes the incentive problems arising from the current
European situation within the context of a principal-agent framework. The
implications for the European situation are given in Section 4. Solutions to the
European principal-agent problem are discussed in Section 5. Section 6
summarises.
2 Related literature
Two strands of literatures are of particular interest with respect to our questions:
the literature on cross-border externalities in banking and the literature on
incentive problems in banking, i.e. the principal-agent literature.
With regard to the latter, there exist several principal-agent relationships within
the banking industry (Lewis, 1997): Relatively well-cited are the following two
relationships: First, the relationship between the bank loan officer (principal)
and the loan applicant (agent), or in general the bank-customer relationship.2
Second, the association between the bank regulator defined as the principal and
the financial institution defined as the agent.3
So far less analysed is the principal-agent problem between the voters-taxpayers
and the banking supervisor. There are a few papers by Edward J. Kane that
relate mainly to deposit insurance: Incentive conflict that government officials
face in operating a deposit insurance fund are examined in Kane (1989a). Kane
(1990) analyses principal-agent problems in the resolution of the Savings &
Loans Crisis in the U.S. The regulatory competition between government bodies
and private self-regulatory organisations is studied by Kane (1991). He stresses
that the benefits this competition achieves are reduced by principal-agent
problems between taxpayers and government officials that lessen the
contestability of the regulatory market. Kane (1997) proposes several measures
of how to align public and private regulatory incentives, such as measures to
unblock information flows or ethical requirements. A scheme of forfeitable
                                       
2 See Sharpe (1990), Diamond (1984), Nakamura (1993).
3 See Baron and Besanko (1984), Dye (1986), Campell et al. (1992), Giammarino et al.
(1993), Nagarajan and Sealey (1995), Sinn (2001).
7deferred compensation for heads of deposit insurance enterprises in order to
align the incentives is suggested by Kane (2002). Moreover, Lewis (1997)
presents a model in which she analyses the incentives that regulators face when
making decisions to take regulatory action focusing also on deposit insurance
regulation. She finds that under the assumptions that the regulator is self-
interested and taxpayers wish regulators to provide a safe banking system, there
exist incentive incongruities so that regulators will not always follow the
principal’s written directive.
Regarding the literature on the externality problem in banking supervision, there
are a few theoretical papers. The externality problem results from the situation
that financial market integration has increased the EU-wide systemic risk
potential. Thus, an individual bank failure in one country could trigger negative
spillover effects in another country. To put it differently, home and host
authorities do not internalise the overall benefits stemming from their own
activities, since they may disregard the effects of their policies on other
countries. Higher supervisory standards in one country have not only positive
effects on the safety and soundness of the domestic banking system, they also
make foreign banking markets where the domestic country’s banks operate more
stable by reducing the likelihood of bank failure in those markets. This may
result in an underprovision of the public good supervision.
Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2001) present a model where regulators are
concerned with their banking system’s stability and efficiency and with their
banks’ profitability. They show that in the presence of cross-border externalities
in banking regulation a solution where regulators set their regulatory policy non-
co-operatively is collectively inefficient.
Stolz (2002) analyses the optimal design of banking supervision in the presence
of cross-border lending. She shows that supervisors will not take cross-border
contagion effects into account, if they are accountable only to their own
jurisdiction.
Kahn and Santos (2002) focus on the consequences of the allocation of the
lender of last resort and the supervisory function for the degree of forbearance in
closing distressed banks and for the level of diligence in the supervision of
banks. They conclude that the integration of banking markets without the
integration of supervisory functions increases forbearance and decreases
diligence in supervision.
Holthausen and Ronde (2003) analyse co-operation between national authorities
that are assumed to maximise the welfare of their own country in the supervision
and regulation of a multinational bank. They show that first best closure
8regulation cannot be implemented unless the interests of the countries are
perfectly aligned.
To sum up, all these papers on the externality problem show that in the presence
of spillover effects national supervisors fail to implement the optimum
supervisory policy from a supranational perspective.
The aim of our paper is to incorporate the externality problem given by the
current European situation into a principal-agent framework thereby focusing on
the conflict of interest between voters-taxpayers as the principals and bank
supervisors as their agents.
3 The principal-agent problem between taxpayers and
supervisors
3.1 Players, incentives and information restrictions
To analyse the incentive problems that arise in the supervision of banking
institutions in Europe we first define the players and describe their objective
functions based on their (individual) incentives and the information available to
them. There are three players (in each country): the banking industry, the voters-
taxpayers and the regulator. Figure 1 summarises the relationships between the
three players in a two-country setting.
The banking industry
There exists – as mentioned above – the well-researched principal-agent
relationship between the banks and the regulator. Regulators are not able to
observe the quality of the bank’s assets. Consequently, banks may have an
incentive to take excessive risks thereby shifting risk to depositors. This
relationship is not of direct interest in the context of our paper, where the focus
is on the principal-agent relationship that is established between the regulator
and the taxpayers. Nevertheless, it is important for the analysis of the taxpayers-
regulator relationship to know about the incentives of the banks and the
information flows between the banking industry and the taxpayers and the
regulators, respectively.
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The objective of the banking industry is profit maximisation. Profits of banks
(P ) are assumed to depend on the level of supervision or the supervisory effort
(e) and the earnings from their loan portfolio (r).
In more detail, profits of banks in country i (Pi ) depend on both the regulatory
policy or effort of the home supervisor ( ie ) and of the foreign supervisors, that is
the level of regulation imposed on their foreign competitors in country j ( je ):
( , , )i i je e rP . Regulatory measures are disliked by the banks since they impose a
constraint on a bank’s operations, and are, thus, costly to the bank (Dell’Ariccia
and Marquez, 2001). 4 Such costs may also take a more explicit form since in
most countries banks have to – at least partly – fund the budget of the
supervisory agency. Thus, it can be assumed that bank profits are lower for
                                       
4 Heinemann and Schüler (2003) find empirical evidence for the view that banks may press
for lower supervisory standards since banks regard regulation as a cost burden. Note,
however, that banks have of course an existential interest in financial stability and, thus,
prefer good regulation to no regulation. An unregulated system would, moreover, scares
off potential customers.
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higher supervisory standards: 
( , , )
0
i
i j
i
e e r
e
¶P
<
¶
. The interrelation between bank
profits in country i and the supervisory effort in country j is not clear cut: On the
one hand, a bank benefits when its competitors in other countries are more
heavily regulated: 
( , , )
0
i
i j
j
e e r
e
¶P
>
¶
. On the other hand, a bank operating via a
subsidiary in that country would benefit from lower supervisory standards:
( , , )
0
i
i j
j
e e r
e
¶P
<
¶
. The dependence of the banks’ profit on the level of regulation in
other countries may be seen as a result of the integration of the European
banking markets.
Bank profits increase with the earnings from their loan portfolio: 
( , , )
0
i
i je e r
r
¶P
>
¶
.
In order to maximise earnings, banks have an incentive to increase the risk of
their portfolio, thereby shifting the risk implicitly to depositors or deposit
insurance companies, respectively and, thus, ultimately to taxpayers. This is
because the bank benefits directly from a high rate of return of risky loans if
they do not default. If, however, the risky loans default and the bank eventually
fails, the deposit insurance schemes are liable for the losses. This excessive risk
taking is possible since the regulator, and of course society in general, is not able
to observe the quality of the banks’ portfolios. In addition, banks may try to
disinform regulators and the general public, i.e. taxpayers to obscure the
excessive risk taking (Kane, 1997). Disinformation aims at exploiting the
information asymmetry by distorting the inferences and deductions that less
informed parties make from the available data.
Moreover, the banking industry, i.e. the regulatees seek to influence and shape
regulation to serve its interests (e.g., Kane, 1997, 2002). 5 This may be done by
using lobbying pressure and side payments.6
                                       
5 Stigler (1971) introduced this notion of regulatory capture.
6 Note that from that perspective the banking industry may also be regarded as a principal to
the regulatory agent. By – at least partly – accounting for the interests of regulatees
supervisors may be seen as serving two classes of principal: the regulated industry and
taxpayers (Kane, 1997). Within the context of this paper we focus on the principal-agent
relationship between taxpayers and regulators and do not explicitly regard the banking
industry as a principal. However, by considering the influence of the banking industry on
the supervisors we implicitly take this “second principal” into account.
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Voters-taxpayers
National taxpayers are defined as the benevolent, social welfare-maximising
principal (Lewis, 1997, Kane, 2002). Generally speaking, society that comprises
taxpayers, voters and depositors is the principal. In what follows we make no
notational distinction between those groups of society and use the expression
voters-taxpayers or simply taxpayers, since national taxpayers would ultimately
bear the cost burden of financial distress and a banking crisis.
The objective of the taxpayers is to maintain national financial stability (F ).7
Financial stability in country i is assumed to depend on the portfolio risk of the
banks operating in the home country i and in the foreign country j: ( , )i i jF s s ,
with 
( , )
0
i
i j
i
F s s
s
¶
<
¶
 and 
( , )
0
i
i j
j
F s s
s
¶
<
¶
. The dependence of the stability in the
home banking market from the portfolio risk of foreign banks – or generally the
risk in the foreign banking market – constitutes the externality in European
banking resulting from the EU-wide systemic risk potential.
As mentioned above, there exists a gap of information between taxpayers and
banks concerning the portfolio risk. In addition, the banking industry disinforms
taxpayers about the quality of their loan portfolio. Beyond the problem of
information asymmetry and disinformation, individual depositors face high
fixed costs of directly monitoring banks’ risk taking, that in turn creates free-
riding problems. For the individual taxpayer it is efficient to rely on trustworthy
regulatory agents to monitor and discipline banking institutions on its behalf
(Kane, 1997).
Thus, taxpayers appoint the supervisor as their agent to control banking risk and
secure the safety and soundness of the national banking system. Banking market
stability can be maintained by the regulators by providing sufficient supervisory
effort (e ).8 Since the stability in country i is influenced by the banking risk in
country j, taxpayers expect the regulator to take also these cross-border
externalities into account.9
                                       
7 We disregard taxes, i.e. revenues from a possible taxation of bank profits that would benefit
taxpayers. Thus the sole objective of voters-taxpayers is to ensure financial stability which
is (besides consumer protection) the ultimate objective of banking supervision from a
welfare maximising point of view.
8 Note at this point that there are also costs associated with supervisory effort. Simply
maximising e would in fact maintain financial stability, however, would at the same time
increase costs to society. Thus, from the taxpayers perspective the aim of maintaining
financial stability implies to optimise the level of supervisory effort.
9 This implies that taxpayers know about the existence of the EU-wide systemic risk potential.
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Taxpayers do neither observe the supervisory effort of the home regulator ( ie ),
nor that of the foreign regulators ( je ). Moreover, there is disinformational
reporting by regulators (see below). This information gap between the taxpayer
and the regulator constitutes the principal-agent relationship.
It becomes further difficult for the taxpayers to monitor their agent adequately,
due to the above mentioned lack of information about the banks’ portfolio risk.
Taxpayers collect from regulated firms almost no information useful to monitor
regulators (Kane, 1997).
Regulators
Regulators are appointed by taxpayers to serve as their agents and supervise the
banking sector to safeguard financial stability.10 Regulators can maintain
financial stability by controlling banking risk. This implies that the risk in
banking market of country i is influenced by the supervisory effort of the home
regulator, and also – due to externalities in supervision – by the supervisory
effort of the foreign regulator: ( , )i i je es , with 
( , )
0i i j
i
e e
e
s¶
<  and 
( , )
0i i j
j
e e
e
s¶
< , i.e.
higher supervisory effort decreases banks’ portfolio risk and increases financial
stability. Consequently, financial stability can be regarded as a function of the
supervisory efforts at home and abroad: ( , )i i jF e e , with 
( , )
0
i
i j
i
F e e
e
¶
>
¶
 and
( , )
0
i
i j
j
F e e
e
¶
>
¶
.
This is obvious in the case of branches in European banking: The home
regulator is responsible for monitoring the foreign branch of a domestic banking
institution, thereby influencing banking market risk and, hence, financial
stability in the host country ( 0
j
j
j i
F
e
s
s
¶¶
>
¶ ¶
). In general, due to cross-border
interbank lending and EU-wide systemic risk potential, the supervisory policy in
one country, affecting directly the banks in that country, will have effects on the
banking risk in other countries.
However, bank regulators may not pursue social welfare, i.e. aiming solely on
maintaining financial stability, but may rather pursue self interest (Kane, 1990,
Boot and Thakor, 1993). To put it differently, regulatory agents are not
unconflicted or faithful, merely protecting the interests of taxpayers and
                                       
10 Note that the notions “regulator” as well as “supervisor” do not necessarily relate to the
actual person employed at a supervisory agency but rather to the supervisory institution.
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resisting private incentives (Demirgüc-Kunt, 1991). In contrast, they can be
assumed to be conflicted, tempted by private interests rather than, or in addition
to, those of the taxpayers.
In choosing a certain level of supervisory effort, a welfare maximising regulator
would solely aim on safeguarding stability in the banking market. That would
include that in the case of distress of an individual institution the faithful
regulator would take action to avert danger from the whole banking system, i.e.
systemic consequences. Such supervisory action may include closing the bank
after having compared the economic costs of allowing the institution to fail with
those of allowing it to operate. Moreover, a welfare maximising regulator would
not only take the systemic consequences in the home market into account, but
also the cross-border effects.11
In contrast, self interested regulators pursue, at least to some extent, narrow
private benefits – or, generally speaking, not the interests of society as a whole.
Such self interesting behaviour that deviates from welfare maximising may have
different origins and take different forms:12
As mentioned above, regulatees, i.e. the banking industry, seek to influence and
shape regulation to serve its interests through, e.g., lobbying pressure and side
payments. Thus, regulators may serve to a certain extent those interests.
The relationship between the regulators and the banking industry may create
another incentive: Regulators may pursue a career in the banking industry after
serving in the supervisory agency (Kane, 1991, Lewis, 1997).
Moreover, regulatory agents may have a desire to escape blame for poor
performance by their agency (Goodhart, 1996, Mishkin, 2001). This is, why they
may hide the problem of an insolvent bank and hope that the situation will
improve. Kane (1989b) characterises this behaviour as “bureaucratic gambling”.
Besides, regulators may protect their careers by acceding to pressures from the
politicians, the people who strongly influence their careers (Mishkin, 2001).
Consequently, self-interested regulators, instead of imposing sufficient
supervisory standards, may have an interest to engage in regulatory forbearance
                                       
11 Of course even a faithful regulator may not be able to take cross-border externalities into
account due to lack of information. Such information problems between regulators are
discussed in the next section.
12 In general, self-interested behaviour of regulators may of course be derived from the theory
of bureaucrats (Tullock, 1965, Niskanen, 1971).
14
and cover-up. This is especially true, when the distress of a banking institution is
not yet publicly recognised (Kane, 2002).
Of course one can not expect the regulator to disregard financial stability at all.
Otherwise regulators would have to fear sanctions from taxpayers or at least a
loss of reputation if the banking sector would experience a crisis that is widely
recognised. In that sense the objective to maintain financial stability derives also
from the self interest of the agent.
However, despite this self interesting behaviour that is inherent to the agent, one
can certainly not deprive regulators of not acting welfare oriented at all. Hence,
the inclusion of banking market stability in the objective function of the
regulator may also be seen as partly derived from an altruistic, welfare
maximising behaviour.
To sum up, the objective function of supervisory agents includes financial
stability, the profits of the banking industry and some form of a private welfare
function of the regulator: ( ( , ), ( , , ), ( ))i ii j i j iV V F e e r P es s= P , where all arguments,
F , P  and P , enter the objective function with a positive sign.
The profits of the banking industry are included since regulators are expected to
serve to some extent the interest of the regulatees. The private welfare function
( P ) decreases with supervisory effort: ( ) 0¶ <
¶
i
i
P e
e
. This represents the incentive to
engage in regulatory forbearance. Providing lower supervisory standards
benefits the regulator. To put it differently, higher supervisory effort brings
about private costs to the regulatory bureaucrat. Of course, this interrelation
holds only up to a certain degree: Regulatory forbearance that jeopardises
severely the stability of the banking market, resulting in a banking crisis, would
be highly visible. This would mean a loss of reputation for the regulator and
would, e.g., limit his future employment opportunities – in short, lessen his
utility.13
Inherently within the principal-agent relationship asymmetric information exists
favouring the agent. As mentioned above, supervisory performance can not be
directly observed by the taxpayers. Moreover, the regulatory agent produces
disinformation that makes it even harder for the taxpayers to monitor whether
the level of supervisory effort is provided that satisfies their interests. Since
there are often no strict disclosure requirements and truth-telling discipline it is
                                       
13 Thus, to be formally correct one could think of a threshold e  of supervisory effort that
provides a minimum of financial stability. Only above this threshold the private welfare
function P decreases with supervisory effort.
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easy to disguise reasons for regulatory actions and specific flows of sectoral
benefits (Kane, 1997). This problem of accountability is discussed in the next
section.
3.2 Conflict of interests between taxpayers and regulators
Of course there should be a contract aligning the incentives of the agent to that
of the principal (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Certainly, in banking supervision
there exists an implicit contract between regulatory agents and voters-taxpayers
since regulators are usually accountable to politicians that are elected by the
principals. However, even if one assumes benevolent welfare-maximising
politicians fully acting in the interests of voters-taxpayers, information
asymmetry and disinformation makes it extremely difficult to monitor the
supervisory performance, thereby leaving regulators imperfectly accountable.
Thus with incomplete information it is impossible for society to prevent
regulators from shirking to some degree the regulatory duties which they are
assigned (Kane, 1997).
The consequence is what Kane (1991) calls an “incentive breakdown”. As can
be seen from comparing the objective functions of the voters-taxpayers with that
of the regulatory agent, the incentives of the supervisor deviate from those of the
principal, the voters-taxpayers. In the European context this incentive problem
has a “vertical” and a “horizontal” dimension.
The vertical dimension is represented by the vertical relationships in Figure 1. It
refers to the “traditional” principal-agent relationship in a national context. This
means that instead of, e.g., imposing sufficiently high capital requirements and
closing down insolvent institutions, the supervisor engages in supervisory
forbearance. Thus, the principal-agent problem constitutes an important
impediment to successful prudential supervision of the banking system.
In addition, the incentive problem has also an international or horizontal
dimension which is represented by the horizontal relationships in Figure 1. As a
consequence, the incentive problem has a further implication in addition to
regulatory forbearance: National regulatory agents do not take sufficiently cross-
border externalities into account. This disregard of the externality problem may
also be regarded as a special form of regulatory forbearance. Taxpayers are
interested in a stable national financial system. Since the stability of one country
is influenced by banking risk in other European countries (
( , )
0
i
i j
j
F s s
s
¶
<
¶
)
taxpayers expect regulators to account for these interdependencies when
choosing their supervisory effort. Regulators, in contrast, are only partly
concerned with financial stability, but in addition pursue private interests.
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Consequently, the supervisory effort may be suboptimal from a welfare-
maximising perspective.
In the specific European context, self-interesting behaviour of national
regulators is implied by the institutional setting, in particular the home country
control principal. The host supervisor is not in charge of monitoring branches of
foreign banks. Thus, potential threats from these branches to the stability of the
domestic financial market may be disregarded, i.e. supervisory effort form the
perspective of the host countries taxpayers is suboptimal. In this case “self-
interest” stems from the lack of responsibility and power – and not from
inherent incentives.
Regarding the home country supervisor the “classical” self-interest argument
applies. The home supervisor is, according to the home country control principal
responsible for monitoring the foreign branches of domestic banking
institutions. However, he may have an incentive to engage in regulatory
forbearance with regard to foreign branches. This is because taking action on a
foreign branch would reveal low regulatory performance, thereby limiting the
regulators private welfare function (P ). In this situation the incentive to engage
in regulatory forbearance may even be stronger when the foreign branch is
relatively small from the perspective of the home country. This is because in the
case of distress of the foreign branch the adverse consequences for the home
financial market would be negligible. However, the foreign branch may be
relatively large from the perspective of the host country, thus, posing a severe
threat to the host country’s financial stability. 14
Self-interested behaviour by the regulatory agent induces an additional problem:
Information problems between the home and the host regulator may be
aggravated. In order to disguise poor regulatory performance the home regulator
may produce disinformation not only to his principal but also to the host
regulator. Thus, without good information it becomes difficult for the host
regulator to assess the potential threat stemming from a branch of a foreign
banking institution. Likewise, the host regulator may lack the incentive to keep
the home authority informed, since it has limited formal responsibility (Enria
and Vesala, 2003). For the home supervisor it would be useful to obtain
information of general market surveillance that is collected by the host regulator.
Such information would for example be helpful for tracing any idiosyncratic
risk-taking compared with other institutions in that market. Generally speaking,
disinformation between national regulators makes it almost impossible to
                                       
14 Note that the additional incentive for regulatory forbearance does not directly constitute a
conflict of interest between the home country’s taxpayer and the home regulator, since the
home taxpayer is also not directly concerned with the host country’s financial stability.
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appropriately consider potential cross-border externalities arising from EU-wide
systemic risk.
To sum up, in the European context there are the following incentive problems
(horizontal dimension) in addition to the “classical” conflicts of interest (vertical
dimension) in the national principal-agent setting (Enria and Vesala, 2003):
Firstly, supervisors may not take into account the externalities on the other
country’s financial system and economy as a whole. Secondly, the regulatory
agents may not sufficiently monitor the cross-border activities of financial
institutions. Thirdly, regulators may not deliver relevant information to the other
supervisor.15 These incentive constraints apply to both the host and the home
country regulatory agent. The consequence of this incentive problem is a
suboptimal level of supervisory effort.
4 Implications for the European situation
The above analysis in the principal-agent framework has revealed a number of
interesting implications for the European situation and, hence, answers to some
of the questions raised in the introduction.
An increasing EU-wide systemic risk potential does only insufficiently increase
the supervisory effort. Cross-border externalities are not taken into account by
national regulators appropriately. This is because, private interests affect the
behaviour of the regulatory agent. This may be self-interest in the “classical”
sense, such as pursuing support or side-payments from serving regulatees
interests or enhancing future employment opportunities and, thus, escaping
blame for poor supervisory performance. Or – in the European context – it may
be “self-interest” arising from the institutional setting, in particular the home
country principal, and from lack of responsibility. Thus, the fact that there exists
only a contract between the principal and the agent at the national level is partly
the reason for a suboptimal regulatory effort.
The incentive problem comprises also incentive conflicts with regard to the
monitoring of the foreign activities of banking institutions between the home
and host regulator. It should be emphasised that these particular incentive
problems are not of great importance in the case of foreign subsidiaries, since
subsidiaries are independent legal entities and, thus, are under the control of the
                                       
15 Note that with respect to information in addition to this incentive constraints there may be a
resource constraint that hampers effective functioning of the supervisory framework (Enria
and Vesala, 2003). There may be a considerable burden for the home authority to obtain
and process information for efficient consolidated supervision of the institutions for which
they are responsible. Moreover, it may be difficult to identify beforehand the relevant
information from a vast amount of information.
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host country supervisor.16 The problem is most eminent in the case of branches
established abroad that are legally an integrated part of the parent bank and of
course in the case of any other direct cross-border activities of banks which may
affect the stability of the host country’s banking market. Although the incentive
problems stemming from the lack of responsibility are not given in the case of a
foreign subsidiary there remain information problems in either case.
Furthermore it should be pointed out that the incentive conflicts between home
and host supervisors are particularly severe in the case of small host countries.
In that case the activities of the foreign bank are large enough to affect the
stability of the host country’s banking market. The home country regulator
overall supervises only a small fraction of the banking market, however, has to
deal with the whole consequences of a bank distress. Mayes and Vesala (2000)
stress the importance of this dilemma for the Scandinavian countries. And this is
de facto also a problem for many Eastern European countries that are going to
join the EU.17
Do the current arrangements at the EU-level overcome the incentive problems?
It is sometimes argued that the existing bilateral and multilateral arrangements at
the European level help to solve the problem of suboptimal supervision
stemming from the principal-agent-problem by enhancing co-operation between
national supervisors. In particular there are no legal obstacles to cross-border
information exchange among authorities and Memoranda of Understanding
(MoU), i.e. means of how to arrange bilateral co-operation in practice, are quite
widespread. Besides, there are multilateral MoUs18 and also committees such as
the Banking Supervision Committee (BSC).19 However, the question remains of
whether these existing arrangements are able to align the incentives of the
principals (taxpayers) with the agents (supervisory authorities).
                                       
16 Subsidiaries may fail independently of the parent company since they are separated as legal
entities. Therefore, the subsidiary needs its own banking licence and must respect the
regulatory framework of the host country (see, e.g., Dalen and Olsen, 2003).
17 Note that in Poland, for example, in 2002 the capital funds and assets of the commercial
banks controlled by foreign investors represented 78.4% and 67.2%, respectively, of those
of the banking sector as a whole (NBP, 2003). The result of this situation is a reluctance of
the supervisory authorities to allow banking activities in the form of foreign branches in
fear of losing control of the stability of the national banking market (Markowski, 2003).
18 In addition to MoUs among several national regulators, that often deal with specific
multinational banking institutions, a MoU has been signed in March 2003 by the ECB, the
national central banks and banking supervisory authorities of the EU.
19 For a detailed description of these arrangements see, e.g., Schüler (2003b). For details
concerning the MoUs see Enria and Vesala (2003).
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The existing arrangements do not explicitly address the principal-agent
relationship between taxpayers and supervisors. They do not, for example, alter
the implicit contract between them. However, they may shift the incentives of
the supervisors in the direction of those of the taxpayers, in the sense that
regulators no longer disregard cross-border externalities and sufficiently
exchange information with other national supervisors.
Since MoUs are normally not made public there is only limited information
available on their content. Typically, bilateral MoUs include practical provisions
with regard to the establishment of a branch, supervisory co-operation on an
ongoing basis and co-operation in the field of on-site inspections of branches
(European Commission, 2001). Thereby, the existing MoUs aim at clarifying
procedures to foster co-operation between national supervisory authorities.
According to Enria and Vesala (2003) MoUs do not resolve the incentive
problems with regard to the exchange of information between the home and the
host regulator. They argue that the existing MoUs may be interpreted as
incomplete relational contracts between the home and the host supervisor.
Although procedures are specified and a general understanding is created, the
substance of the relationship is left unspecified. Moreover, the fact that MoUs
are not legal documents makes this incomplete relational contract unenforceable
in courts of law. Thus, against the background of asymmetric information
between supervisors of different countries, regulators may again choose to
pursue private interests at the other party’s expense.
In addition to the bilateral MoUs, that focus on branches and subsidiaries there
exist multilateral MoUs and multilateral committees at the European level, such
as the Banking Supervision Committee (BSC). These mechanisms for
multilateral co-operation try to deal with EU-wide systemic risk in general, since
branches and subsidiaries are not the only, and probably not even the most
relevant, channel of cross-border spillover effects. Furthermore, these
multilateral agreements comprise principals of co-operation in crisis
management situations.
The same line of argumentation regarding the incentive constraints identified for
the bilateral relations applies also to the multilateral forms of co-operation
(Enria and Vesala, 2003). They constitute only incomplete relational contracts –
ultimately, they are not binding – which leaves room for regulators to pursue
private interests.
To sum up, the existing arrangements at the European level are not sufficiently
successful in solving the incentive problems that national supervisors may
disregard cross-border externalities, insufficiently monitor the cross-border
activities of banks, and not deliver relevant information to other supervisors.
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Thus, the incentives between the taxpayers as the principal and the supervisors
as their agents are not necessarily aligned by the existing arrangements.
5 Solving the European principal-agent problem
The question remains of how to resolve the incentive conflict between taxpayers
and supervisors. The first best solution would be a contract between the
regulator and the society that fully aligns incentives (Kane, 1997). Management
contracts for government officials usually do not include positive incentives of
compensation that rises and falls with success in achieving taxpayer goals.
Supervisory agents’ salary does not depend on their success in safeguarding the
stability of the financial system. An optimal contract would give regulatory
managers a symmetric and transparent stake in the benefits and costs which their
enterprise, i.e. the supervisory agency, generates for taxpayers.20 However,
society fails in developing such contracts. In general, the reason for that is a lack
of accountability due to the above analysed information asymmetries and, thus,
deficient enforceability. Moreover, financial stability, i.e. society’s goal, is also
influenced by factors, that are not under the control of the regulator. The result
of this failure of developing the optimal contract is a welfare loss whose size
must be controlled in other ways.
Solutions to the principal-agent problem in EU banking supervision have to
consider both the vertical dimension, i.e. the explicit relationship between the
taxpayers and the national regulators, and the horizontal dimension, i.e.
externality problem arising form EU-wide systemic risk and the relationship
between national supervisory authorities.
5.1 Single European agency
A solution to the incentive problems arising from cross-border systemic risk
would certainly be a centralisation of supervisory responsibilities. A single
European supervisory agency with a European mandate should not have any
incentives to disregard cross-border contagious effects from one national
banking market to another one. Moreover, monitoring cross-border activities of
banks shouldn’t cause any incentive problems since the focus would clearly be
on the European banking market and no longer on single national markets.
There wouldn’t exist any problems due to lack of responsibility. And finally,
having a single authority would solve the problem of not delivering relevant
information.
                                       
20 As a feasible start, Kane (2002) proposes a scheme of forfeitable deferred compensation for
heads of deposit insurance enterprises in order to align the incentives of the agents with
those of the principals.
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At a first glance the creation of a single European agency would constitute a
common agency problem, i.e. a situation where one agent (the single European
supervisory agency) contracts with several principals (the national taxpayers),
and the principals non-co-operatively provide incentives for the agent
(Bernheim and Winston, 1986). However, in our situation the incentives of the
multiple principals, the national taxpayers, do not differ. They all have the same
objective, namely a stable banking system, which is no longer national in scope
but rather European. Thus, we would end up with the same principal-agent
problem at the European level, the single European supervisor being the agent
and the “European society” the principal. Clearly, the horizontal dimension, i.e.
incentive problems arising from the EU-wide systemic risk potential, would be
resolved.
However, the vertical dimension of the incentive conflict would still remain:
With asymmetric information and insufficient accountability a single European
supervisory agency would also have incentives to pursue private interests and,
hence, to deviate from the interests of the principal. For solving this dimension
of the incentive conflict other measures have to be employed that will be
discussed below.
Beside this normative arguments that speak in favour for the centralisation of
supervisory responsibilities at the European level, there exists, however, a
crucial political constraint: At the moment a single European supervisory
authority doesn’t seem to be feasible within the near future due to national
resistance to give up responsibility (Economist, 2003, Thygesen, 2003).21
Therefore, at least in the meantime, other solutions have to be found to align the
incentives of the principal and the agent. In addition, it may be questionable
whether a single European agency would be the optimal solution from an
efficiency point of view since this would bring about a huge – possibly too
bureaucratic – authority. 22
5.2 Enhancing co-operation between regulators
An alternative to a single European supervisory agency would be keeping the
national based framework and improving co-operation and co-ordination
between national supervisors. This approach is currently pursued with the
                                       
21 One of the problems is that the fiscal costs of handling a crisis have to be meet at the
national level, because there is no EU-wide budgetary competence for this purpose
(Schoenmaker, 2000, 2003).
22 For the pros and cons of a single European supervisory authority – and moving supervision
to the European level in general – see, e.g., Meister (2000), Vives (2001), Schoenmaker
(2003).
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bilateral and multilateral MoUs and the committees at the EU level. However, as
discussed above, the current arrangements fail to align incentives and to solve
the horizontal dimension of the principal-agent problem due to their implicit
character.
Enria and Vesala (2003) propose explicit agreements with respect to the
exchange of information between national regulators. Such agreements should
comprise two elements: first, a pre-commitment by the respective authorities to
exchange information based on signals which are verifiable at least ex-post.
Second, mechanisms to check and enforce compliance through some kind of
penalty system for a breach of agreement. With respect to the first element,
Enria and Vesala propose for example that market surveillance information from
the host supervisors could be guaranteed by stipulating a threshold in terms of
the importance of the host country’s business for the institution as a whole.
Moreover, a capital threshold could be defined below which the home authority
should inform the host regulator. Important in this context is also some
standardisation of the MoUs in order to achieve the necessary consistency. The
second element, enforcement of compliance, is of course very difficult to
implement in practice. On this matter, legal obligations may need to be
considered. Like already in existence for enforcing fiscal discipline, Enria and
Vesala suggest an EU level body which monitors the behaviour of the
authorities and which can issue statements concerning compliance and, in
addition, may possess means of pecuniary penalties.
Another proposal with regard to cross-border co-operation and co-ordination is
the concept of “lead supervisor” derived from the Swedish example, where large
and complex financial institutions (LCFI), with the potential to threaten
financial stability in more than one jurisdiction, dominate the financial system
(Johnston, et al., 2003, Hammarkvist, 2003). 23 In cases of such large banking
institutions that operate to a substantial amount in several countries, there would
be a clear assignment of supervisory responsibilities to a lead supervisory
authority. The joint supervisory group – comprising the lead supervisor and all
other concerned national supervisors – would operate under a multilateral
MoUs. The establishment of the leader could follow clear a priori defined rules.
In this context one could think of some measure reflecting the importance of the
banking institution for the different markets (such as market shares) and the
importance of the respective market for the banking institution (such as
turnovers in that market). Of course, as with the other MoUs, it would be of
crucial importance to have explicit agreements between the supervisors
involved, including some mechanisms of enforcing compliance.
                                       
23 LCFI are defined as cross-functional and cross-border financial institutions (Johnston et al.,
2003). The focus in our paper lies on the cross-border aspect.
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Ultimately, enforcement of agreements between two or more national regulators
constitute the main drawback of the approaches of MoUs and the concept of the
lead supervisor. Consequently, there remains the risk that regulators may still
have room for pursuing private interests.
Moreover, these concepts tackle only the horizontal dimension of the incentive
problem. Therefore, in any case, measures to enhance co-operation and co-
ordination between national supervisors, as well as a single European
supervisory authority, have to be complemented by other measures that also deal
with the vertical dimension of the incentive problem.
5.3 Improving accountability of regulators
In order to align incentives between the regulatory agent and the taxpayers it is
essential to ensure accountability of the agent for regulatory mistakes, that – in
the European context – include disregarding cross-border risks. Improving
accountability comprises the following issues (Kane, 1997): First, it requires
making supervisory actions and their consequences more transparent. This
includes unblocking the information flow from both the regulator and the
banking industry to the principal, i.e. enhancing public disclosure. Moreover,
penalties on incompetent supervisory behaviour have to be imposed. In this
context strengthening private oversight, i.e. the disciplinary role of the market
becomes crucial.
Without doubt, improving accountability of regulators in practice turns out to be
rather difficult than suggesting it in principle (Goodhart, 2001). The reason for
that is particularly that the objective of supervision and, hence, supervisory
performance is hardly measurable. It is per se not clear whether financial
stability – or more practically speaking, the absence of financial crisis – is
achieved due to luck and conjuncture or due to the efforts of supervisors.
Despite these practical caveats, transparency and market discipline are crucial
when – at least – trying to improve accountability of supervisory bodies.
Enhancing public disclosure
In order to make the regulatory agent more accountable for his actions (and no-
actions), it is essential to improve the information flows between all players
involved. Taxpayers – or in general society – have to be informed about the
actions of the regulatory agent and their consequences. Moreover, taxpayers
need to have reliable information about the subject of regulation, i.e. the banking
industry and the banking risk. Only when having such information an
assessment of the supervisory performance is possible. As discussed in Section 3
(see also Figure 1), there is information asymmetry between the taxpayers and
the supervisor, and the taxpayers and the banking industry, respectively. In
24
addition, disinformation may distort the inferences and deductions that the
society makes from the available data. Thus, unblocking of the information
flows and thereby reducing information asymmetries is necessary.
A direct way of doing so is to impose self-reporting obligations on the
regulatory agent and the regulated banking industry alike (Kane, 1997).
Supervisory authorities should report on what they are trying to achieve, and on
their successes and failures. Publication of reports on supervisory actions taken
and their general results might be useful. Since any announcement of actions on
specific occasions could impair confidence in the “target institution”, reports
should not be made public at the time but rather be published after some delay
(Goodhart, 1996, 2001).
With respect to transparency, the UK’s Financial Services Authority (FSA) may
serve as an example. The FSA must publish a consultation paper to any
regulatory rule of general guidance it makes and must accompany this by a cost-
benefit analysis and a detailed statements of compatibility with the FSA’s
statutory objectives and principals of good regulation (Alfon and Andrews,
1999, Briault, 2003). By doing so, the FSA does not only take costs imposed on
regulated firms into account, but also the costs and benefits to consumers and a
wide range of other considerations. Of course, there are a lot of practical
difficulties of assessing the costs and especially the benefits of regulatory
actions (Goodhart, 2001). Thus, the obligation of an analysis rather than a
quantification of the benefits and costs could be advisable. In any case, cost-
benefit-analyses can contribute to improving regulators’ compliance culture by
offering a non-partisan way to discuss regulation. Thereby, cost-benefit-analysis
enhance in a practical manner the accountability of regulators.
Surely, supervisory authorities already publish annual reports where they
disclose information on their supervisory policy. However, information here is
often held relatively general. Moreover, in the EU quite a number of supervisors
are part of the central bank and in the annual report of the central bank
disclosure on supervisory policy is relatively scarce. Thus, there remains room
for improving disclosure of supervisory authorities.
One may argue that scarce information is necessary with respect to potential
adverse market reactions. Thus, as mentioned above, publication of potential
market relevant information should be made with a delay. 24
Ultimately, the aim of improving disclosure is to make information available to
the public so that the quality of the work of the supervisory agent can be
                                       
24 Note in this context also that the argument of “constructive ambiguity” does not apply since
we do not talk about improving disclosure with regard to crisis management.
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assessed. In addition to enhancing disclosure of supervisory authorities, one way
of doing an assessment of the supervisory performance is to survey the regulated
industry on their perception of the benefits and costs of regulation (Goodhart,
1996). Such surveys should be carried out by an independent body that – given
the horizontal dimension of the incentive problem – should be located at the
European level. The information from such surveys would probably be biased
and, thus, of limited value. However, given the potentially small costs of such
surveys, the marginal benefits should exceed the marginal costs.
For assessing the supervisory performance it is also necessary to have reliable
information about the regulated industry. At present disclosure requirements
differ considerably between countries. There are initiatives on the way to
improve disclosure and align obligations across countries in the EU (CEPS,
2003). Improving disclosure of information by the banking institutions seems to
be particular of importance with respect to risk taking strategies, risk exposures
and risk management tools (Mayes and Vesala, 2000). In this context, the
supervisory regime of New Zealand which is extensively based on market
discipline may be viewed as an example (Mayes, 2000). For financial
institutions in New Zealand quarterly disclosure of relevant bank information is
mandatory, including for instance the number of large exposures (including
interbank exposures) as measured relative to the bank’s equity. To enable the
disclosure of the full extent of the risks that have been run, New Zealand
requires the disclosure of peak exposure, not just some quarterly average or end-
period value. In the European context, such requirements would include
improving disclosure concerning cross-border risks which is particularly of
importance against the background of the horizontal dimension of the incentive
conflict.25 In addition to increasing disclosure requirements penalties have to be
implemented so that banking managers have incentives for proper disclosure.
With information about the banking risk publicly available it is difficult for the
regulatory agent to engage in regulatory forbearance (Enria and Vesala, 2003).
Public disclosure of information would also help to alleviate the information
problem between the host and the home regulator (Mayes and Vesala, 2000): It
would help the home authority to collect information on the global activities of
its institutions and the host authority on the activities of foreign branches. In
                                       
25 Note that in New Zealand all banks, except for very small ones, are subsidiaries or branches
of larger banks which are headquartered elsewhere. Therefore, it is often argued that the
supervisors in New Zealand, by relying largely on market discipline, are free riding on the
supervisory efforts of its larger neighbours (Goodhart, 2001). Nevertheless, some
measures, such as improved disclosure of risks may well serve as an example for the
European case.
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general, with the information being less confidential, incentive problems to
exchange information may be reduced.
Strengthening market discipline
Improving public disclosure of supervisory agents and banking institutions helps
the principals to assess the supervisory performance of the agent. This is a
necessary condition for improving accountability and, hence, solving the
incentive problem. However, it is not sufficient. The market must also be willing
to monitor regulatory performance and there have to be mechanisms in place to
discipline regulators in case of poor supervisory performance.
It is often argued that regulatory competition between governmental and private
supervisory institutions protects society from over-regulation and also mitigates
negative effects resulting from incentive problems (Kane, 1997). Regulatory
competition could take a disciplinary role.26 Market discipline and corporate
governance with respect to the banking institutions strengthens the overall
supervisory system by improving bank managers’ incentives for prudent risk-
taking. Consequently, the opportunities for regulatory forbearance by the
supervisors are reduced and, thereby, the incentive conflict between regulatory
agents and society is alleviated.
Thus, policies aimed at strengthening the disciplinary role of private watchdog
institutions are important (Johnston et al., 2003). Such private agents comprise
for instance accounting and auditing firms, regulating financial analysts and
rating agencies.
With the above mentioned measures to improve disclosure of banking
institutions these agents should have sufficient information at hand. Besides, the
market needs to have incentives to monitor activities. Of course, it is not the
general public that looks at the information disclosed. Usually, it is the financial
news media, market analyst, credit rating agencies, counterparties and
competitor banks that are interested in the documents and publish assessments
                                       
26 The underlying notion is that regulation may be presumed to have a market in which it is
voluntarily purchased and sold (Kane, 1991, Kane, 1987). Government bodies and private
self-regulatory organisations are sellers and financial services firms are buyers. As Kane
argues there exists regulatory market power. The reasons are that first, the number of
potential new entrants that can economically supply regulatory services is limited. And
second, there are typically high costs of entering and exiting the regulatory market.
Potential entrants would need an authority for raising and distributing funds and the means
for exercising disciplinary power. In addition, government entities have the right to shift
costs to taxpayers giving them financial strength and the right to use the force of law to
punish violators. All this gives an advantage in the market to government bodies.
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of the banks. Market discipline occurs not so much because of what is actually
said but because of what might be said (Mayes and Vesala, 2000, Mayes, 2000).
Thus, banks are keen to act so as to avoid the need for unwelcome disclosure. It
is more the potential threat of unwelcome disclosure that produces compliance
in the first place.
In addition, ceding monitoring functions to agents directly responsible to
subordinated debt holders can help to complement the overall supervisory
system.27 In this regard, market discipline is generated by an adequate number of
creditors that are not covered by deposit insurance. Since their funds serve as
loss absorber in the case of a bank failure, holders of subordinated debt have a
stimulus to care for the soundness of the bank.
Certainly, market discipline based on improved disclosure has its limitations
(Llewellyn, 2001): More transparency may increase, rather than decrease
instability in some instances. Furthermore, there may result incentives to free
ride on the information generated by others.
Supervisor of the supervisors
There may also remain questions on whether the disciplinary role of the market
is sufficient to enforce accountability of the regulatory agent. Ultimately, there
may be a need for further mechanisms of punishment in addition to the
disciplinary role of the market. As in the context of explicit MoUs (see Section
5.5.2) one could think of an EU level body which based on the information
disclosed and maybe the above mentioned surveys of the financial industry, tries
to assess the supervisory performance of the regulators.
Another proposal is an international monitoring agency for regulators made up
of members of supervisory agencies from other countries (Goodhart, 2001).
Such an external “college” would be required to submit a grading and give its
explanations publicly. This would help to identify suboptimal supervisory
performance, thereby, improving accountability of regulators. The potential
problem with this “self-regulation for regulators” would be that incentives to co-
operate with other supervisors might even be lessened. Thus, participation of
international organisations such as the Bank for International Settlement (BIS),
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank would be advisable.
Initiatives such as the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), a joint
effort by the IMF and the World Bank, tend in this direction, but they need to be
generalised and applied to all countries.
                                       
27 See Calomiris and Kahn (1991), Calomiris (1999), Board of Governors (1999, 2000), Bigus
and Prigge (2002).
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In addition, it may help to improve the monitoring incentives of news
organisations and academic researchers to enhance the public debate about
financial supervision (Kane, 1997). With regard to the regulatory authority the
same argument applies as to financial institutions monitored by the market: The
potential threat of unwelcome news produces compliance in the first place. The
disciplinary action results more from what might be said than what actually is
said. Thus, regulatory agents will make an effort to act so as to avoid the need
for unwelcome disclosure. Such potential unwelcome disclosure would be
ensured by the above discussed measures to improve disclosure of supervisory
authorities as well as by the international monitoring group for regulators.
To sum up, although accomplishing accountability of supervisory bodies in
practice remains a difficult task, market discipline based on enhanced disclosure
both of supervisory authorities and regulated banks may help to improve
accountability and, thus, alleviate the incentive problems. This refers to the
vertical dimension as well as to the horizontal dimension of the principal-agent
problem.
However, improved disclosure and market discipline are no panacea. Market
discipline can only complement a proper design of supervisory arrangements
(Vives, 2001). The above discussed proposals, i.e. a single European
supervisory authority or a system of bilateral and multilateral co-operation and
co-ordination between national supervisors, seem to be both appropriate when
supplemented by stronger market discipline based on improved disclosure.
6 Summary
Analysing banking supervision in a principal-agent framework helps to explain
the existence of regulatory failure (Kane, 1989a). It has been shown that the
interests of the regulator (agent) deviate from those of the principal, the
taxpayers, or in general the society. The reason for that is that the regulatory
agent in addition to maintaining financial stability (the ultimate objective of the
principal) may pursue private interests. Incomplete information, insufficient
accountability of the regulatory agent and lack of enforceability of compliance
result in an incentive problem. In the European context this incentive problem
comprises two dimensions: The vertical dimension refers to the “traditional”
principal-agent relationship in a national context. The horizontal dimension
results from the fact that there exists EU-wide systemic risk potential. Thus,
regulatory forbearance in the European context includes also disregarding of
cross-border externalities, insufficient monitoring of foreign branches, and lack
with regard to the exchange of information with other supervisors.
Since the first best solution, i.e. a contract between the regulator and the society
that fully aligns incentives, is not achievable other solutions are needed. In this
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paper we stress the importance of improving accountability of the supervisory
agent through market discipline based on enhanced disclosure of both the
supervisory authority and the regulated banking industry. With respect to the
supervisory authority, enhanced disclosure could comprise delayed publication
of reports on supervisory actions taken and their general results. In addition,
publication of cost-benefit-analyses of regulatory actions (as already done by the
FSA in the UK) may contribute to improving regulators’ compliance culture by
offering an objective way to discuss regulation. Improving disclosure of
information by the banking industry seems to be particular of importance with
respect to risk taking strategies, risk exposures and risk management tools.
Strengthening the disciplinary role of the market would alleviate the incentive
problem in two ways: Directly, since regulatory agents would be keen to
improve their regulatory performance in order to avoid the need for unwelcome
disclosure. And indirectly, since market discipline with respect to the banking
institutions strengthens the overall supervisory system by improving bank
managers’ incentives for prudent risk-taking, thereby, reducing the opportunities
for regulatory forbearance.
In addition, an international monitoring agency for regulators, by providing
gradings and the reasoning behind them, may help to identify suboptimal
supervisory performance, thereby, improving accountability of regulators.
However, accomplishing accountability in practice remains a difficult task and
improved market discipline can only complement a proper design of supervisory
arrangements. Therefore, a reform of the current European supervisory
framework is needed. A single European supervisory authority would solve the
horizontal dimension of the incentive problem by internalising cross-border
externalities in supervision. However, due to political constraints an
improvement of the current system of co-operation and co-ordination of national
regulators may be more advisable. In this context, the establishment of explicit
arrangements and mechanisms of punishment to ensure compliance are crucial.
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